In the public key cryptosystems, revocation functionality is required when a secret key is corrupted by hacking or the period of a contract expires. In the public key infrastructure setting, numerous solutions have been proposed, and in the Identity Based Encryption (IBE) setting, a recent series of papers proposed revocable IBE schemes. Delegation of key generation is also an important functionality in cryptography from a practical standpoint since it allows reduction of excessive workload for a single key generation authority. Although efficient solutions for either revocation or delegation of key generation in IBE systems have been proposed, an important open problem is efficiently delegating both the key generation and revocation functionalities in IBE systems. Libert and Vergnaud, for instance, left this as an open problem in their CT-RSA 2009 paper. In this paper, we propose the first solution for this problem. We prove the selective-ID security of our proposal under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model.
Introduction
for that time period from their secret key and the key update. For a non-revoked user, there is at least one subkey among the log N size key, where N is the maximum number of users. Since the CS method is secure against colluding and allows short key updates, the resulting RIBE scheme is well scalable and secure.
1
Delegation Functionality in IBE. For a large network, a single KGC has an excessive workload for performing computationally expensive key generation and establishing secure channels to transmit each user's secret key. To mitigate this problem, Horwitz and Lynn [14] introduced the concept of HIBE such that the responsibility for key generation is distributed to the lower-level KGC by delegating key generation functionality. Numerous constructions for HIBE schemes and variants with additional properties have subsequently been proposed [11, 3, 4, 6, 10, 23, 25, 16] .
Delegation of Both Key Generation and Revocation Functionalities in IBE.
Although IBE schemes with either efficient revocation or efficient delegation for key generation functionality have been proposed, it is non-trivial to achieve both functionalities at the same time, and in fact Libert and Vergnaud left this as an open problem at CT-RSA 2009 [18] . We simply call such a scheme having both functionalities a Revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme. There are some difficulties in achieving RHIBE.
1. Trivial approaches will lead to exponentially large secret keys in the corresponding hierarchical level.
2. Key generations and key updates are recursively defined: this leads some difficulty in the security proof.
All existing scalable RIBE schemes utilize binary tree structures, that is the CS method, for revocation. In the scalable RIBE scheme using the CS method, a secret key of each user consists of log N subkeys, where N is the number of all users and at least one subkey of a non-revoked user ID can be used to generate a decryption key dk ID,T from the key update ku T on a time period T. If we extend the RIBE scheme for the RHIBE scheme in a natural way, the second-level user has to have (log N ) 2 subkeys since one of the subkeys of the paraent's key can be used in each time period so that a child should have a log N subkey for each parent's subkey. In general, ℓ-level users have (log N ) ℓ subkeys, so the size of the secret key exponentially grows in the corresponding hierarchical depth.
For constructing RHIBE, if we follow the same strategy used by all scalable RIBE schemes, KGC may not be able to directly generate secret keys of descendants (except for the first-level user). Each intermediatelevel user's secret key is generated according to the shape of the binary tree structure, which is managed by its parent. However, the KGC does not know such a binary tree, so the KGC cannot create secret keys of intermediate-level users. (Note that the KGC can generate decryption keys for all descendants.) Therefore, the secret key and key updates have to be recursively defined. This makes the situation more complicated. In particular, in the security model the adversary can query secret keys of descendants of the challenge identity, but it is non-trivial to recursively generate such secret keys without knowing the challenge identity's secret key. We explain the detailed difficulty in Section 4.
method [20] , the Boldyreva et al. scheme is scalable in the sense that the costs of the KGC logarithmically depend on the number of users. Although their scheme is secure under a relatively weaker notion, called selective-ID security, Libert and Vergnaud [18] proposed adaptive-ID secure RIBE by applying a variant of the Waters IBE scheme [19] . In the proof of the Libert-Vergnaud RIBE scheme, the simulator can construct all the secret keys (as in the Gentry IBE [9] ) to answer the secret key query for the challenge user. Recently, a RIBE scheme from lattices [7] was proposed.
In R(H)IBE, each decryption key is computed from the long-term secret key and key update information. Dodis et al. considered a similar functionality which we call key-insulated PKE [8, 1, 17] and IBE [13, 12, 26] . A user computes its decryption key from the long-term secret key and a helper key served in physically insulated storage. A difference between key-insulated PKE and RIBE is that the former requires a secure channel between a user and the storage for every key update, but the latter needs a secure channel only once for transmitting each user's secret key from its ancestor. Moreover, since each helper key is generated for each user, the total size of the helper key linearly depends on the number of total users, whereas it logarithmically depends on the number of total (i.e., non-revoked) users in RIBE.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows. The next section gives preliminaries. In Section 3, we define a syntax and a security model for the RHIBE scheme and we propose our RHIBE construction in Section 4. Lastly, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and give a conclusion with interesting open problems.
Preliminaries
This section gives the definition of the bilinear groups, the DBDH assumption, the KUNode algorithm [2] , and the definition of HIBE, and introduce the BB-HIBE scheme.
Definition 2.1 (Bilinear Groups). The bilinear group generator G(·) is an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a bilinear group
, where p is a prime of size 2λ, G and G t are cyclic groups of order p, and e is an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G × G → G T with
• Non-degeneracy : for a generator g of G, e(g, g) ̸ = 1 Gt , where 1 Gt is identity element in G t . 
Definition 2.2 (Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption). Given a bilinear group
(p, G, G t , e) generated by G(λ), define two distributions D 0 (λ) = (g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) abc ) and D 1 (λ) = (g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) z ),Adv DBDH G,A (λ) = Pr[A(D 0 (λ)) → 1] − Pr[A(D 1 (λ)) → 1] .
We say that the DBDH assumption holds in the bilinear group (p, G, G t , e) if no Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem in the bilinear group (p, G, G t , e).
Our RHIBE scheme is based on the BB-HIBE scheme [3] , which is IND-sID-CPA secure under the DBDH assumption. The revocation method in each level of our construction follows Boldyreva et al.'s way using binary tree structure. The following KUNode algorithm is essentially used for revoking users in our construction. 
Definition 2.3 (The
We give a simple example of KUNode in the fugure 1. Next, we define HIBE and introduce the BB-HIBE scheme as follows. 
Definition 2.4. A hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) consists of four algorithms
There are conditions that A should follow. 
If the function Adv
is negligible in the security parameter λ, the we say that the scheme HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure.
The BB-HIBE scheme is described as follows.
Enc(ID |ℓ , M, mpk): Choose a random value t $ ← Z p and return 
Syntax and Security Model of RHIBE
We give formal definitions of the hierarchical identity-based encryption with efficient revocation scheme, which is simply called the Revocable Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (RHIBE) scheme, and its security by extending those of the revocable IBE in [2] . An RHIBE scheme consists of seven algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, KeyUp, DKG, Enc, Dec, and Revk. Roughly speaking, the Setup algorithm is run by the trusted authority called the Key Generation Center (KGC) for system parameters and a corresponding master secret key. When a user (possibly the KGC) generates a child's key, it can run the KeyGen algorithm with its secret key (the master secret key for the KGC) and a child's identity. If some users are revoked, the identities of revoked users should be updated along with each user's revocation time period. A (ℓ − 1)-th level user ID |ℓ−1 issues key update information ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T at every time period T by running the KeyUp algorithm. This information is managed by the binary tree BT ID |ℓ−1 which is served in the state st ID |ℓ−1 . While performing revocation, senders do not need to be updated and can encrypt a message using the receiver's identity, a time period that the receiver can decrypt, and the Enc algorithm. Every user ID |ℓ that is not revoked on time T can create a decryption key dk ID ℓ ,T from ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T by running the DKG algorithm, so that only a non-revoked user ID |ℓ (on time T) can decrypt an encrypted message for the identity ID |ℓ and the time period T by using the decryption key dk ID |ℓ ,T and the Dec algorithm. Figure 2 explains the hierarchical structure with binary tree structures and we also provide the formal syntax of the RHIBE scheme below. 
There are three conditions that A should follow. 
The challenge messages

The advantage of the adversary A is defined as
Adv IND-sRID-CPA RHIBE,A (λ) = Pr[Exp IND-sRID-CPA RHIBE,A (λ) = 1] − 1 2 .
If the function Adv
is negligible in the security parameter λ, we say that the scheme RHIBE is IND-sRID-CPA secure.
Our Construction
In this section, we propose our main construction for the RHIBE scheme. For revocation, we use the same methodology using binary structures as that used in all prior scalable RIBE schemes. In the RHIBE scheme, each intermediate level user ID |ℓ−1 has its own binary tree BT ID |ℓ−1 for revoking capabilities and issues the key update ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T at each time period T. Then, a non-revoked child user ID |ℓ can generate dk ID |ℓ ,T from the key update ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T and its secret key sk ID |ℓ .
Before providing our construction, we first define several notations for simple description of the proposed construction, which is given in Table 1 . Our RHIBE scheme is based on the BB-HIBE scheme [3] . As we mentioned before, a trivial approach for delegation of revocation functionality will end up with exponential secret key size in the hierarchical level. Therefore, our main contribution is to propose an efficient way of dealing with delegation of revoking capabilities and show that the proposed methodology does not harm the semantic security of the underlying BB-HIBE scheme; that is, in the security proof, we give a reduction to the IND-sID-CPA security of the BB-HIBE scheme.
For a decryption key of a user ID |ℓ at a time period T, we use a hierarchical extension as follows: 
Preparation Notation Meaning
For g ∈ G and 
decryption keys are divided into secret keys and key updates. In particular, the master key g α 2 is randomly divided into two parts R θ and g α 2 /R θ , where we will explain θ later. The secret key of ID |ℓ contains information about
,
p , and the key update for a time T, which is managed by ID |ℓ−1 , contains information about
p . Let R θ be assigned in the node θ in BT ID |ℓ−1 , ζ ID |ℓ be the leaf node assigned for ID |ℓ in BT ID |ℓ−1 , and Path(ζ ID |ℓ ) be the path from ζ ID |ℓ to the root node in BT ID |ℓ−1 . If sk ID |ℓ contains the above form for all θ on Path(ζ ID |ℓ ) and key update on time T contains the above form for all θ in KUNode(BT ID |ℓ−1 , RL ID |ℓ−1 , T), then a non-revoked user ID |ℓ can generate the corresponding decryption key by a simple product of the above two forms since there exists at least one θ in Path(
If we consider revocable IBE schemes, the above method is sufficient. However, when constructing the RHIBE scheme, we should consider the fact that users can generate valid key updates for children only during the time period in which they are not revoked. This implies that both secret keys and key updates should contain information about all ancestor's secret keys and key updates. To this end, we recursively define children's secret keys and key updates from parents' secret key and key update. Note that if we use binary tree structures for revocation, the KGC cannot directly generate secret keys of descendants (except for the first-level user) since the master key parts of decryption keys of descendants are randomly divided into two parts (each for the secret key and key update) according to the binary tree structure managed by their parents, which are also intermediate-level users, but the KGC does not know of such a binary tree structure. Therefore, the secret key and key updates have to be recursively defined, which makes the situation more complicated.
A simple example helps to explain our construction for delegating the revocation functionality. Assume that a user ID |1 = I 1 is not revoked on time T. The secret key of ID |1 and the key update ku 0,T generated by the KGC are
respectively, where ζ ID |1 is a leaf node assigned for ID |1 by the KGC. The user ID |1 has its own binary tree structure BT ID |1 for revocation functionality. The revocation methodology used by ID |1 is the same as for the KGC. Whenever a child ID |2 registers in the system, it randomly assigns a leaf node
We use notation
, where θ is the j-th level node, and notation
, where θ ′ is the j-th level node. The key update on T is computed as follows. Assume that ID |1 is not revoked on time T. Then, ID |1 can choose a node θ in Path(ζ ID |1 ) ∩ KUNode(BT 0 , RL 0 , T). Let Lv 1 be the level of θ in BT 0 . Note that all nodes in Path(ζ ID |1 ) have different levels, so we can identify nodes from their corresponding levels. Then,
) is a valid key update for the first level users including ID |1 , and the key update for children of ID |1 is generated as
.
. The decryption key of ID |2 on time T is generated as follows. First, it identifies the subkey part of sk ID |1 that is used by its parent for delegation on time T. (It can see from Lv 1 in ku ID |1 ,T .) Let θ be the level
It then generates the decryption key as
) .
A simple calculation shows that the above decryption key has the desired form
In a similar way, we can define the secret keys and key updates for users from other levels. However, the security of the above construction is not easy to prove since descendants have a great deal of information about the ancestors' secret keys. In particular, in the security model the adversary can query sk ID * 
where j is the level of θ on the path Path(ζ ID |1 ).
Return [1,n] .
ℓ > 0 : Randomly choose an unassigned leaf ζ from BT ID |ℓ , and store ID |ℓ+1 in the node ζ ID |ℓ+1 . Parse
For all θ ∈ Path(ζ ID |ℓ+1 ) ⊂ BT ID |ℓ , 1. Recall R θ from the corresponding node θ in BT ID |ℓ if it is defined. Otherwise, R θ $ ← G and store it in the node θ.
where j is the level of θ in the tree BT ID |ℓ .
Return
KeyUp(sk ID |ℓ , T, RL ID |ℓ , st ID |ℓ , ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T , mpk): According to the value ℓ, this algorithm is differently defined. 1. Recall R θ from the node θ ∈ BT 0 . Note that R θ is already defined during the key generation process.
Choose δ θ
Note that if ℓ = 1, then {Lv i } i∈ [1, 0] 
DKG(sk ID |ℓ , ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T , T, mpk):
and
2. If J ∩ Path(ζ ID |ℓ ) = ∅, then return ⊥. Otherwise, choose a node θ ∈ J ∩ Path(ζ ID |ℓ ) and let Lv ℓ be the level of θ in Path(ζ ID |ℓ ) ⊂ BT ID |ℓ−1 .
Compute and output dk
Enc(ID |ℓ , T, M, mpk): Choose a random value t $ ← Z p and return Efficiency. For encrypting to the ℓ-th level user, the ciphertext consists of ℓ + 2 group elements in G and an element in G t . The decryption algorithm requires ℓ + 2 pairings and ℓ + 3 multiplications in G t . Each user in the ℓ-th level keeps (ℓ + 2)(ℓ + 1) log N group elements in G as its secret key.
Security Analysis
We provide a series of lemmas to thoroughly explain the forms of secret keys, key updates, and decryption keys well, and then give a theorem for the IND-sRID-CPA security of the proposed construction.
Lemma 5.1. If a secret key sk ID |ℓ is normally generated, it has the following form:
) for a uniformly distributed vector − → r (i,j) ∈ {0} × Z Proof. We prove the lemma using the mathematical induction methodology. When ℓ = 1, the lemma is true since the output of KeyGen algorithm run by KGC is exactly of the form. Next, we assume that the lemma is true for ℓ ≥ 2, and then we show that the lemma is true for ℓ + 1. If we run KeyGen algorithm with sk ID |ℓ as input, we obtain the following equalities.
where j is the level of θ in BT ID |ℓ . In the process of KeyGen,
, which is stored in st ID |ℓ , is commonly used for all children ID |ℓ+1 , and R ′ (i,j) is also used independently from the children's identity by hypothesis. Furthermore, R θ is an associated value, which is also stored in st ID |ℓ , with the j-th level node θ on Path(ζ ID |ℓ+1 ) ⊂ BT ID |ℓ . From these facts and the above two equalities, we can see that sk ID |ℓ+1 satisfies three conditions in the lemma. In particular, − → γ (i,j) ,R (i,j) , and R θ are uniformly chosen from their domains, respectively, so that all randomness used in sk ID |ℓ +1 are independent from those in sk ID |ℓ . Therefore, we complete the induction method, and so the proof.
Lemma 5.2. If a key update ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T is normally generated, it has the following form:
, Proof. First, we note that the statement in Lemma is well-defined; ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T is generated by ID |ℓ−1 , but
is a value defined in the children's secret key
. However, by the second condition in Lemma 5.1,
is independent from the children's identity so that the statement is well-defined.
When ℓ = 1, it is straight from the output of KeyUp. We assume that Lemma is true for ℓ ≥ 2, and show that the case for ℓ + 1 also holds. A user ID |ℓ , who is not revoked, can generate a key update ku ID |ℓ ,T by running KeyUp with ku ID |ℓ−1 ,T as input. The output of KeyUp is
andθ is the Lv ℓ -th level node in KUNode(
where 
Moreover, R θ is an associated with a node θ by the process of KeyUp and if for some ID |ℓ+1 , θ is in the Lv ℓ+1 -th level in KUNode(BT ID |ℓ , RL ID |ℓ , T) ∩ Path(ζ ID |ℓ+1 ), then we can see R θ is also is used in the generation of decryption key part by Lv ℓ+1 ) ). Therefore, we obtain the desired result. By the induction method, we complete the proof for all ℓ.
Lemma 5.3. If a decryption key dk ID |ℓ ,T is normally generated, it has the following form:
Proof. When θ is the Lv ℓ -th level node in KUNode(
By Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, this is equal to
Even though our KeyGen algorithm (KeyUp algorithm, respectively) is recursively defined, the above lemmas dictate that the secret key (key update, respectively) in each level has the same format and the randomness used in each level is totally independent from those in the other levels. This fact gives us an essential advantage when we construct a simulator in the security proof; when the simulator generates a secret key (key update, respectively), it is not necessary to generate all ancestor's secret keys (key updates, respectively), though KeyGen (KeyUp, respectively) is recursively defined in the real scheme. Instead, in the proof, the simulator can directly simulate with fresh randomness. • Type-0 adversary: The adversary does not issue any key extraction query for ID * |1 , . . . , ID * |ℓ * .
• Type-1 adversary: The adversary queries for the secret key of ID * |1
. . .
• Type-i adversary: The adversary does not query for the secret key of ID * |1 , . . . , ID * |i−1 , but does for ID * |i . . . .
• Type-ℓ * adversary: The adversary queries for the secret key of ID * |ℓ * , but she does not issue any key extraction query for all ancestor's secret key.
B can guess the adversarial type by tossing coins and his guess is information-theoretically hidden from the adversarial view so that B can success in his guess with at least 1/(L + 1) probability. During simulation, B can generate only either secret key of the challenge identity or key update for the challenge identity. (If not, B can generate decryption key for the challenge ciphertext.) By guessing types of adversary, B can decide where the (unknown) master key part is contained between secret key and key update. (Recall that in our construction the master key is randomly divided into secret key and key update.)
B sends ID * |ℓ * to the IND-sID-CPA game challenger C as B's target identity. Then, B obtains the master public key mpk = {g,
c , and sends the group description and {g, g 1 , g 2 , h 0 , h 1 . . . , h L } to A as public parameters of RHIBE scheme. The corresponding master key of the BB-HIBE scheme is {g α 2 }, which is also the master key of our RHIBE scheme and unknown to B, where g 1 = g α . For other queries such as key update and secret key extraction queries, B responses according to his guess in the type of adversary. We will describe B's behaviors separately. However, regardless of the type of adversary, whenever receiving a key extraction or a key update query regarding ID |ℓ , B assigns nodes ζ ID |1 ∈ BT 0 , . . . , ζ ID |ℓ ∈ BT ID |ℓ at random if they are undefined.
Type-0 adversary
The KeyUp Oracle: Receive ID |ℓ and T. If 
and return ku ID |ℓ ,T = { {Lv i } i∈ [1,ℓ] ,
. 
) ,
and θ is a j-th level node on Path(ζ ID |ℓ+1 ). 
where
and θ is the j-th level node on Path(ζ ID |ℓ+1 ) ⊂ BT ID |ℓ .
The case of ID
B behaves as the KeyGen oracle in the case of type-0 adversary.
Challenge Phase: B behaves same as in the challenge phase in the case of type-0 adversary.
Analysis of B:
We argue that if B correctly guesses the type of adversary, then B's advantage in INDsID-CPA game is equal to A's advantage in IND-sRID-CPA game.
In the simulation, B uses the same target identity, time period, and messages as those used by A, and it delivers the output bit of A to C. Therefore, for proof of Lemma, it is sufficient to show the simulated transcript between A and B is identical to those in the real experiment.
The public parameter mpk is uniformly distributed since h 0 is uniformly and independently distributed and other parts are given from the public parameter of BB-HIBE. For the challenge ciphertext, B * can be written of the form g t , Then,
. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext is also well distributed identically to that of real experiment. Next, we consider the distribution of output of KeyUp(·) and KeyGen(·) oracles. From Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5. $ ← Z p , the first condition holds. S (i,j) is stored in st ID |ℓ and it is used for all children so that the second condition also holds. S θ is stored in the node on Path(ζ ID |ℓ+1 ) ⊂ BT ID |ℓ , and so S θ is a value associated with the node θ. Therefore, if θ is the j-th level node, then we can consider S θ g α 2 as R ′ (ℓ+1,j) such that the third condition of Lemma 5.1 holds.
Next, we show that each key update satisfies all conditions in Lemma 5.2. In the simulation of key update, S θ and S (i,Lvi) are used such that S θ and S (i,j) are also used in the secret key of ID |ℓ+1 . From the above simulation of KeyGen, we know that S θ g α 2 = R ′ (ℓ+1,j) and S (i,Lvi) = R ′ (i,Lvi) , and so
Therefore, the distribution of ku is equal to that in Lemma 5.2.
Type-k adversary: We argue that S (i,j) and S θ in the output distribution of KeyGen are distributed with the following conditions: 
where j is the level of θ. Therefore, we complete the proof of theorem.
From the theorem 2.1 and theorem 5.1, we obtain the following corollary. 
Summary and Open problems
We proposed the first construction for efficient delegation of both key generating functionality and revocation functionality in the IBE system.
There are interesting open problems. Our construction is based on the BB-HIBE scheme and we proved only selective-security of our construction. Natural open problem is to construct RHIBE scheme based on more efficient (in the sense of the ciphertext size) and secure (in the sense of satisfying adaptive-security) HIBE scheme (e.g., [15] ). Another open problem is to combine HIBE scheme with so-called Subset Difference (SD) method [20] (instead of CS). It seems not easy to combine SD with (H)IBE scheme since the SD method requires more complicated key distributing method than CS method.
